President Woodrow Wilson has decided to personally represent the United States at the conference, but it is hard to imagine anyone being more naivideal about the true nature of international relations. (See special “War and Diplomacy,” July 2010 ACG.) Wilson was an intellectually and social “progressive” in good faith, but he often seemed unbearably selfish, and his vision of how nations conducted international relations was at best a triumph of hope over experience – he was convinced that the “good will” of world leaders would supposedly go beyond petty national interests and cynical power relations. Wilson`s idealistic worldview is best documented in his 14 Points declaration, announced in January 1918, in which he calls for free trade, freedom of the seas, open agreements between nations, the promotion of democracy and self-determination among the peoples of the world, and the creation of the League of Nations to ensure territorial integrity and preserve peace in the world. From the Point of view of the French, the resumption of Alsace and Lorraine could appeal to nationalist politicians and serve as a patriotic background to many post-war celebrations, but it did not justify the estimated death of 1.4 million French people. Even after 1919, the French did not feel safe. In addition to the strategic considerations outlined above, the French knew that they were still facing a more populous Germany in the east. They also knew that their former allies were either gone (Tsarrusse) or that they were not willing to sign a mutual security agreement to help France in the future (the United States and the United Kingdom). They also faced the immense task of rebuilding their farms, mines and factories, while those in Germany remained intact. The euphoric atmosphere of November 1918 did not last long.
The Treaty of Versaille was the most important agreement, which came in 1919 from the Paris Peace Conference, which followed the end of the First World War. A new book, “The Treaty Of Versailles: A Concise History,” examines how this treatise was compiled and examines its mixed heritage. One of the things we had to deal with was German disarmament. Kitchen explains that there has been “a general agreement on the disarmament of Germany, but significant differences on how best to achieve this.” 11 Finally, the Allies agreed on the new state of the German army. The German navy was to be limited to 15,000 officers and men, six battleships, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers and twelve torpedoes; In the meantime, the army should be limited to 100,000 men, who should be hired for 12 years. 12 The preamble to the military part of the treaty with Germany suggests that Germany should be disarmed “to allow the introduction of a general limitation on the armament of all nations.” 13 All this is good and good, unless the Germans have not complied with this part of the treaty. One of the main shortcomings of this section was the lack of delays which undoubtedly played in Germany`s favour. 14 No one could expect Germany to be disarmed forever.
However, the treaty did not indicate the duration of disarmament. It was therefore one of the parts of the treaty that Germany has constantly abused and failed to respect out of bitterness. But the treaty, negotiated by the main players of the First World War – in particular France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States – was deeply flawed and could not repel the rise of fascism, the Nazi party and finally the Second World War. But the Germans had believed in the 14 points because they offered a glimmer of hope.